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CRASH TEST DUMMIES:
WHAT DRIVES AUTOMOBILE SAFETY
IN THE UNITED STATES?
Joseph Gavin*

I

nvented at the end of America’s gilded age nearly 125 years
ago, the automobile has grown up with this country, not only
facilitating our industries and growth but also becoming an
inextricable element of our cultural identity. Early innovators like
Henry Ford helped transform what was once a novel luxury into
an affordable and eventually ubiquitous tool. As of 2008,
approximately 256 million vehicles were registered in the United
States. 1 While consumers tend to focus on safety, quality, and
performance when evaluating which car to purchase, few people
pay further attention to car safety once it leaves the dealer’s lot.
In reality, every time an individual gets in a car, they are
entrusting their safety to the design and function of the vehicle.
They are dependent not just on the owner’s successful
maintenance, but also on the bumpers, seatbelts, airbags and 30
or more on-board computers.
Fortunately, there are forces beyond the attentive vehicle
maintainer and the altruistic manufacturers that are constantly
working behind the scenes to make us safer on the roads. There
are three aspects of consumer culture that each claim credit for
the development of auto safety in the U.S. Broadly, these
elements include regulation, litigation and manufacturer
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.,
2007, Kenyon College. The author would like to thank Kathryn Tumen and
the rest of his family for their guidance and support. He would also like to
thank all of the editors and staff of the Loyola Consumer Law Review,
particularly Leslie Cornell and Jack Benge, for their hard work on this
publication.
1
RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
STATISTICS, TABLE 1-11: NUMBER OF U.S. AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES, VESSELS
AND OTHER CONVEYANCES (2009).
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accountability. This note will evaluate these three parties and
their role in auto safety and additionally uncover a hidden fourth
enforcer who is essential to the success of the other three.
Finally, this note will discuss the relevance of the
automotive safety technology currently on the horizon in this
country and conclude by addressing the relative safety of
subcompact vehicles popular in Europe and whether these cars
will ever find favor in America.

I. THE SOURCES OF SAFETY
A. The Historical Context of the Movement for Automobile
Safety
For the first half-century of the automobile’s existence,
automotive safety was rarely a priority for manufacturers or the
government. As automobiles became increasingly popular in the
early part of the century, the federal government saw little reason
to preempt state vehicle laws and therefore confined its
involvement in the industry to contributions for building roads.2
In fact, the first time the U.S. implemented legislation governing
automobile design was not until 1940. 3
At the end of World War II, American soldiers returned
home to a severe housing shortage, which led to a major
suburban sprawl facilitated by the automobile, thereby increasing
the demand for new automobiles and highways. 4 Throughout the
early and middle twentieth century, the U.S. government focused
on injury and fatality prevention primarily through changing
driver behavior rather than improving mechanical safety. 5
According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS):
Engineering attracted some attention, but it was
engineering to prevent crashes. Reducing the
MARTIN ALBAUM, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, SAFETY SELLS:
MARKET FORCES AND REGULATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBAGS 1
(2005).
3
This legislation required all new cars to have sealed beam headlights, a
then-recent invention. Because the law remained in effect until 1984, critics
note the requirement actually resulted in freezing headlight innovation rather
than promoting safety, a pattern that permeated other aspects of automotive
safety design legislation.
4
ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 1.
5
JAMES CASTELLI, CARL NASH, CLARENCE DITLOW & MICHAEL PECHT,
SUDDEN ACCELERATION: THE MYTH OF DRIVER ERROR 19 (2003).
2
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consequences of crashes didn’t get much notice. Because
of the focus on crash prevention, many lifesaving
vehicle designs were overlooked. For example, a few
physicians advocated safety belts in the 1930s, but U.S.
automakers didn’t begin installing lap belts as standard
equipment until the 1960s – and then in response to
state mandates. Shoulder belts didn’t become standard
until the 1968 model year when they were mandated by
federal law. 6
One point to keep in mind is that during this time frame,
the majority of the country had not yet abrogated contributory
negligence in favor of comparative negligence. Because driver
error or negligence was so often partially to blame in automobile
injuries and fatalities, manufacturer liability was precluded.
Therefore, there was little incentive for the manufacturing
industry to investigate deeper into safety concerns. 7
There were, of course, some early advocates of automobile
safety. For example, Hugh DeHaven, a World War I pilot,
started the Crash Injury Research project at Cornell University
in 1942 and later patented the first three-point seatbelt. 8 Dr.
William Haddon, Jr., another early safety advocate, applied his
background as a public health physician and initiated the shift in
focus from crash avoidance to crash survival.9
In the mid-1960s, the ideas of DeHaven and Haddon
started to gain momentum, and there was a major shift in the
national consciousness regarding auto safety. The first impetus in
this shift was Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-

Id.
See NHTSA Removes ‘Accident’ from Its Vocabulary, 3 INJ.
PREVENTION 82 (1997). The government favored the no-fault word “accident”
over “crash” until 1997. In a letter explaining the shift away from use of the
word “accident,” NHTSA Administrator Ricardo Martinez said that the word
“accident” worked against the idea that highway injuries and fatalities could
be prevented; see also Robert J. Eaton, Chairman and CEO, Chrysler Corp.,
Automobile Safety: Transp., Mobility, Safety and Fun, Address Before the
Chief Executive Club of Boston (Nov. 18, 1997), in 64 VITAL SPEECHES OF
THE DAY 214-17, 216 (1998) (“Up and down the halls, signs were changed to
reflect the conviction that when something goes wrong, it’s not simply an
accident. Somebody must be at fault”).
8
Combination Shoulder and Lap Safety Belts, U.S. Patent No. 2,710,649
(filed Feb. 19, 1951) (issued June 14, 1955).
9
CASTELLI ET AL., supra note 5, at 19; see also ALBAUM, supra note 2, at
1.
6
7
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In Dangers of the American Automobile, (“Unsafe at any Speed”),
which was published in 1965.10 The book is famous for vilifying
Chevrolet’s Corvair, which Nader referred to as “The One-Car
Accident,” but it focused on much more than that single
problematic model. 11 It paid significant attention to the interior
surfaces and the idea of the “second collision,” meaning the
collision between the driver or passenger and the interior surfaces
of the vehicle. 12 Most importantly, Nader revealed how
automobile manufacturers were generally reluctant to include
safety features despite the awareness that these features could
save lives. 13 Complementing Nader’s informative book, the
National Research Council issued a report the following year
titled Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of
Modern Society, which also served as a call to action for
consumers to demand improvements in automotive safety. 14
In response to the growing outrage from consumers
regarding the prevalence of preventable automobile injuries and
fatalities, Congress unanimously passed the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (“Act”). 15 The Act, signed by President
Johnson on September 9, 1966, was designed to reduce traffic
accidents and resulting injuries and fatalities. 16 The Act was
passed with the Highway Safety Act of 1966, which laid the
foundation for establishing uniform standards for state highway
safety programs. 17 The powers created by these Acts were
delegated to the administrator of a new government agency called
the National Highway Safety Bureau, which became the
RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED:
OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
10

THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS

Id.
Id. at 86.
13
Following the publication of this book, GM engaged in aggressive
tactics directed at undermining and intimidating Nader. See also Nader v.
General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970).
14
COMM. ON TRAUMA AND COMM. ON SHOCK, DIV. OF MED. SCIENCES,
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACCIDENTAL
DEATH AND DISABILITY: THE NEGLECTED DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY 1
(1966). Because this report was issued in September 1966, the same month that
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Highway Safety Act, the report is
more important as an indicator of the changing public sentiment than as an
impetus for the legislation.
15
ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 12.
16
THE NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT, PUB. L.
NO. 89-563, reprinted in 1 NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
ACT OF 1966: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 3-15.
17
ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 14-15.
11
12
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in
1970. 18 In 1979, the NHTSA created the New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP) which effectively rates and compares the safety
performance of various cars, providing consumers with a
meaningful safety rating relative to similar vehicles, thereby
encouraging manufacturers to voluntarily improve safety
performance. 19 These steps were the first substantive attempts by
the federal government to moderate auto safety through
regulation. This method of reform gained significant momentum
in the following decades and has an important effect on
automotive safety today.
B. Federal Regulation
As discussed above, the first organization controlling
automotive safety in the United States was the NHTSA. This
agency has a “primary mission of saving lives and preventing
injuries associated with motor vehicle crashes.” 20 The NHTSA is
responsible for: 1) promulgating uniform standards for State
highway safety programs; 2) improving vehicle safety by
establishing, prescribing, and enforcing National safety
standards; and 3) informing the public of the comparative safety
of passenger motor vehicles on the market. 21 In order to set these
safety performance standards, the NHTSA has broad authority
to test vehicles and conduct research as it sees fit. 22 It can issue
requests, subpoena documents or other information, conduct
formal hearings or administrative depositions, and request special
reports from relevant entities. 23 Finally, once the NHTSA has
Id. at 15.
DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT
HS 810 698, THE NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM SUGGESTED APPROACHES
FOR FUTURE PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS 3 (2007) [hereinafter NCAP
APPROACHES].
20
DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT
HS 811 337, REPORT TO CONGRESS NHTSA’S CRASH DATA COLLECTION
PROGRAMS at II (2010).
21
49 C.F.R. §1.4. (pertaining only to its direct efforts to effect new car
safety and therefore this paper will not address efforts directed at the used car
market. In addition, the vast power the NHTSA wields through the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations will be addressed in section III of
this paper).
22
49 U.S.C. § 30168, repealed by Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405
(2012).
23
49 C.F.R. §510.3 (2012); 49 C.F.R. §510.7 (2012).
18
19
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established a standard for future automobiles, it must enforce it.
Since its creation in 1966, the NHTSA has had enormous
success. In March 2010, agency administrator David Strickland
told the House of Representatives, “This agency has one goal.
That is to keep people alive and safe on the road.” 24 Illustrating
its success, Strickland reported, “the number of highway fatalities
in 2009 – 33,963 – was the fewest since 1954.” 25 This is especially
impressive considering how many more cars and drivers are on
the road today compared to 1954. In fact, a better illustration of
the success of this agency is that the fatality rate per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled was 1.16 in 2009 versus 5.5 in 1966 (and
6.03 in 1954). 26 Further bolstering the accomplishments of the
NHTSA, as the number of vehicle miles traveled has increased
consistently year after year, the total annual fatality number
increased every year until 1969 when it began steadily
decreasing. 27
The New Car Assessment Program was so successful in
encouraging both manufacturers to design safer vehicles and
consumers to make these demands, that the NHTSA saw fit to
revamp the crash testing and safety rating criteria. 28 Unveiled in
October 2010, the new Government 5-Star Safety Ratings
Program incorporates new tests, new safety rating criteria, and
crash test dummies in new sizes that collect more data regarding
the forces and potential injuries at the time of impact. 29 As a
result of these more rigorous tests, “vehicles that previously
earned five stars may not continue to earn five stars—even if no
changes have been made to the model. . .” 30 In theory, these more
stringent standards will lead to even safer vehicles.
24

Jenna Greene, Toyota Troubles Shielded by Agency, 32 NAT’L 4, 5

(2010).
Id.
DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT
HS 811 346, AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE
TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2008 (2010).
27
Id.
28
Lorraine Gilbert, NHTSA Rolls Out New Safety Rating System:
Features Stiffer Tests, One Score, More Data, 38 PRODUCT SAFETY &
LIABILITY REP. 1053, 1053 (2010).
29
DEP’T OF TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 6 (2010).
30
See Gilbert, supra note 28, at 1053-1054. An important component of
this program is helping consumers make more educated decisions regarding
safety, so the NHTSA created two simple consumer websites to explain the
new tests: www.safercar.gov and www.newstarsoncars.com. The test
performance information can also be found on the vehicle’s window sticker.
25
26
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Despite these improvements, the NHTSA suffers from
some major deficiencies, the most serious of which is funding.
Although the Department of Transportation (DOT), which
oversees the NHTSA, claims safety as its top priority, of the
DOT’s budget (approximately $79 billion for FY 2011) only a
very small percentage is allocated to the NHTSA. 31 Despite the
fact that traffic fatalities account for more than 90 percent of
transportation-related fatalities in the United States, and motor
vehicle crashes are the leading single cause of death for
individuals between the ages of 4 and 34, the NHTSA’s FY 2011
budget request was only $877.6 million. 32
This was
approximately 1.1% of the DOT budget. Furthermore, less than a
third of the NHTSA’s already-small budget will actually go to
safety programs. 33
These budget limitations contribute to other deficiencies in
the NHTSA. In prepared testimony before Congress on March
11, 2010, NHTSA administrator David Strickland reported that
the agency receives more than 30,000 complaints annually, “and
we review each and every one.” 34 However, the NHTSA employs
just 57 people to investigate these complaints. 35 Another weak
point for the NHTSA is the way it aggregates crash data
provided by consumers and manufacturers. By keeping the
information in separate databases, the NHTSA makes it more
difficult for investigators to spot issues and for consumers to
research and compare each model’s safety records. 36
Given these limited resources, the agency is particularly
susceptible to harboring historical biases when determining
DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FY
2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1 (2010); DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2010).
32
DEP’T OF TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 18 (2010).
33
Id. at 15. (NHTSA’s FY 2011 Budget Request of $877.6 million
includes $117.4 million for Behavioral Safety, $132.8 million for Vehicle
Safety, $676.7 million for the National Driver Register, and $620.7 million for
State Grants, High Visibility Enforcement Support, and Grant
Administration).
34
NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. & the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 111th Cong. 6 (2010).
35
Ken Thomas & Stephen Manning, Toyota Troubles Put Spotlight on US
Safety
Agency,
CNBC.COM
(Mar.
11,
2010)
http://www.cnbc.com/id/35821504/NHTSA_Says_May_Need_More_Authorit
y_Over_Auto_Industry.
36
Cars Must Be Safer, CONSUMER REPORTS, May 2010, at 6.
31
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whether to launch new investigations. For example, because the
NHTSA had been unsuccessful in pinpointing the causes of
sudden unintended acceleration in the past, particularly with
Audi in the late 1980s, the agency was more inclined to attribute
the problem to driver error than expend its limited resources on
such an elusive problem. 37 According to Sean Kane, a consultant
who frequently works with plaintiff’s attorneys, in response to
the early complaints against Toyota, “from a policy and resource
standpoint,” the NHTSA “made a decision to walk away” as a
result of this historical bias. 38 Furthermore, although the NHTSA
has broad powers to subpoena information from the
manufacturers, critics note that it is a rare occasion when it
actually invokes those rights, and the NHTSA tends “to side with
the conclusions reached by the carmaker.” 39 On the even rarer
occasion that it does not side with the manufacturer, the
maximum fine that the NHTSA can impose is $16.375 million,
which is hardly even noticeable to a multi-billion dollar auto
manufacturer, let alone a strong deterrent.
In addition to problems related to its limited budget and
authority, the NHTSA has been criticized as having “a culture
where enforcement is a low priority.” 40 One of the reasons for this
may be that the agency suffers from “regulatory capture,” which
is the idea that regulators can become overly deferential to the
industries they are assigned to oversee, forgetting their publicinterest mission in the process. 41 In fact, the NHTSA relies
primarily on the manufacturers themselves to identify the perils
posed by their vehicles. 42 “During agency reviews, officials have
at times minimized or simply rejected consumer accounts of what
happened in favor of the manufacturers’ assessments, records
See Kimberly Kindy & Peter Whoriskey, NHTSA’s Previous Car Pedal
Safety Efforts Died, Stalled Amid Industry Opposition, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
2011, at A12 (Audi had a major issue with sudden unintended acceleration in
the late 1980s, and the NHTSA expended considerable resources investigating
the issue without ever finding a definitive cause. According to E. Donald
Sussman, one of the lead NHTSA researchers studying the complaints against
Audi in 1989, the “NHTSA rarely requires industries to do design changes.
They hope they will voluntarily do the right thing”).
38
GREENE, supra note 24, at 5.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Ben Kelley, Op-Ed, Decades Later, Still Unsafe at Any Speed, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 7, 2011, at 6.
42
Peter Whoriskey, NHTSA Overly Reliant on Carmakers’ Accounts
During Complaint Reviews, Critics Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2010, at A01.
37
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show.” 43 For example, Andrew Card, President George W. Bush’s
chief of staff who had previously served as an auto industry
lobbyist for General Motors, said: “While NHTSA staff tries to do
a good job, they are headed up by political appointees in the
administrative and legal counsel offices. During the 2001-2008
era, those appointees included lawyers from GM and Chrysler . . .
So it may be that some investigations were terminated for
political reasons.” 44 More recently, the two Toyota executives
who convinced the NHTSA to terminate the initial investigation
into sudden unintended acceleration, joined Toyota immediately
after leaving the NHTSA. 45 These practices bring up questions
regarding the legitimacy of the investigations and consequently
the protections being afforded to consumers.
In sum, despite the NHTSA’s commendable efforts to
improve automotive safety since 1966 as well as their statistical
success, the agency’s limited resources and biased nature severely
diminish its willingness and ability to identify new safety
concerns and respond quickly and effectively.
C. Litigation
The second force driving automotive safety is litigation,
generally in the form of civil suits brought against carmakers.
After all, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., a 1916 suit against an
automobile manufacturer, helped shape modern product liability
law. 46 For more than half a century following that case, courts
generally held that automobile manufacturers merely had a duty
to construct a vehicle that was “free of latent and hidden
defects.” 47 However, as Ralph Nader highlighted in his 1965 book
Unsafe at Any Speed, automobile manufacturers continued to
Id.
Andrew Clevenger, W.Va. Lawsuit Targets Toyota, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (West Virginia), January 30, 2010, at 7.
45
R. Graham Esdale, Jr. & Timothy R. Fiedler, Toyota’s Deadly Secrets,
TRIAL MAG., Sept. 2010.
46
AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION
SPURRED AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS 11 (2010); see also MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916).
47
See Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966)
(holding that defendant manufacturer had no duty to construct a crash-proof
car because collisions were not an intended purpose of the vehicle), overruled
by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); See also Richard
M. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3
DUKE L.J. 476, 477 (1936).
43
44
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exhibit willful negligence in their design of vehicles they knew to
be unsafe in collisions. 48 Prior to the 1960’s, design decisions that
valued style over safety were not only possible but even
commonplace because courts generally only held automobile
manufacturers liable when defects in construction resulted in
crashes. 49 Thanks in part to the growing public outrage regarding
auto safety in the mid-1960s, the court took a hard line against
automakers in the 1968 case Larson v. General Motors. 50 In that
case, General Motors claimed that automakers had no duty to
manufacture a product that would be safe in collisions they had
no direct part in causing. 51 The court reasoned that collisions,
with or without fault of the driver, were statistically inevitable,
and therefore should be foreseeable by the manufacturer. 52 The
court imposed upon automobile manufacturers “a duty to use
reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the
user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.” 53
Following a trajectory set by Larson, courts continued to
broaden the duties of manufacturers, especially over the
15 subsequent years. Particularly important cases include Dyson
v. General Motors, which established that carmakers have an
obligation to provide “a reasonably safe container within which
to make the journey,” and Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the
famous 1981 case involving the Ford Pinto, explained later in this
note. 54 The American Association for Justice (formerly the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America) claims that lawsuits,
beyond merely giving victims a right to redress, provide an
essential avenue by which manufacturers are encouraged to
improve their products. 55 Litigation is particularly important in
48
See NADER, supra note 10, at 172. See also AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 46, at 3.
49
AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 3; see also Harold A. Katz,
Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69
HARV. L. REV. 863, 865 (1956).
50
See Larson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968)
(reversing policy voiced in Evans v. General Motors Corp. 359 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 836, 87 (1966) (holding that the risk of
collisions was foreseeable and therefore automobile manufacturers had duty to
design crash-worthy vehicles).
51
Id. at 497.
52
Id. at 501-502.
53
Id. at 504.
54
Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F.Supp. 1064 (Pa. 1969); see also
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (4th D. 1981).
55
AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 3.
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convincing automakers to redesign certain components such as
power windows, seat belts, and tires, among other things, because
historically the NHTSA has been averse to mandating specific
design changes. 56
In addition, there are other less direct ways in which
litigation spurs automobile safety, such as providing
manufacturers with financial incentive to build safer vehicles.
Estimates of the total annual legal expenses of auto
manufacturers varies greatly year to year, but broad liability is
always lurking for automakers. For example, although some of
the Toyota unintended acceleration suits have not yet reached
trial, one expert warned that “legal expenses and damages
resulting from the safety defects could tack billions of dollars onto
the $2 billion that Toyota had said it would cost the company in
repairs and lost sales.” 57 More recently, Toyota customers have
filed “diminished-value” lawsuits whereby Toyota could be liable
for the diminished resale value, possibly around 4%, of the
millions of its cars affected by the recall. 58 Though diminishedvalue lawsuits are notoriously difficult to prove, the economic
damages to Toyota in such a case could exceed $3 billion. 59
Although these numbers seem impressive at first glance,
they pale in comparison to a general manufacturer’s overall
revenue. Even a $3 billion loss to a company like Toyota would
not be catastrophic considering Toyota “reported more than $200
billion in worldwide sales for the fiscal year that ended March
2009.” 60 Furthermore, these financial incentive arguments fail to
support the idea that litigation serves as more than an expensive
hassle. It leaves unanswered the question of whether the lawsuits
really figure into the automakers’ design and production
decisions. In Toyota’s case, the scandal caused the company to
reform its management and design process in order to encourage
better communication and more thorough engineering. 61
Id. at 5, 6, 9; See also Kindy & Whoriskey, supra note 37, at A12.
Jerry Hirsch & Stuart Pfeifer, Toyota Faces Massive Legal Liability,
L.A.TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at 9.
58
Id; see also Justin Berkowitz, Unintended Depreciation: Former and
Current Owners Suing Toyota for Lost Resale Value, Car & Driver (last visited
Oct. 21, 2012) http://blog.caranddriver.com/unintended-depreciation-formerand-current-owners-suing-toyota-for-lost-resale-value/.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Mark Rechtin & Hans Greimel, How Toyota Attacked the Crisis,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, at 10.
56
57
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However, the Toyota scandal is the exception rather than the
rule. Moreover, it was not litigation alone that drove the
company to overhaul its corporate structure.
Critics of this pro-litigation argument are quick to point
out that manufacturers often debut safety features in European
countries, which are vastly less litigious than the United States,
years before installing those features on the U.S. versions of their
cars. 62 One likely explanation for this paradox is that the
European version of the New Car Assessment Program
(EuroNCAP) imposes tougher safety standards than the
NHTSA. 63 The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, a group
that represents 11 automakers, likened lawyers taking credit for
safety innovation to “the rooster taking credit for the sunrise.” 64
The group argued that in fact litigation and innovation were
mutually exclusive and that focusing on litigation “does nothing
to advance technology, instead it delays progress.” 65
In conclusion, although there is some truth to the claim
that “the civil justice system, when called upon through litigation,
spurs motor vehicle innovation and enforcement of safety
standards,” the manufacturers make clear that other important
and unrelated forces are also at work behind the scenes making
this possible. 66
D. Manufacturers and Market Forces
The third force driving automotive safety is the
manufacturers themselves. Not surprisingly, carmakers strongly
disagree with the perspective that favors litigation as the main
catalyst for changes in automotive design. Today, “automakers
expect to be sued no matter what they do,” meaning there is an
argument to be made that they are best served by focusing
primarily on the design elements that will make a car sell rather
than what would make a passenger safe. 67 In the 1950s, Lee
Iacocca, who would later go on to become president at Ford and
Lorraine Gilbert, Attorney Group Says Litigation Spurs Innovation in
Vehicle Safety Features, Regs, 38 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REPORTER
424, 424 (2010).
63
Tristan Honeywill, Marketing Safety, 34 AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEER 3, 3
(2009).
64
Gilbert, supra note 62, at 424.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
62
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create the Pinto, famously quipped that “safety doesn’t sell.” 68
Regardless of his intent, the truth is that before the 1960s, safety
really was not a selling point for consumers. Fortunately, that is
no longer the case.
The sudden flurry of interest in automotive safety that
resulted in the creation of the NHTSA in the late 1960s repeated
itself a decade later. As mentioned previously, in 1978 a jury
awarded Richard Grimshaw, a driver who had been permanently
injured in an accident in a Ford Pinto, $125 million in punitive
damages against Ford. 69 Although the damages were eventually
scaled back significantly, Grimshaw’s case caused the public to
take notice of the importance of automobile safety features.
Following the creation of the NCAP in 1979, the number of
references to safety features in automotive advertisements began
to increase. 70 The importance of safety performance really took
off in the mid-1990s, when the NCAP introduced the five-star
ratings system that made it easier for consumers to compare a
vehicle’s safety performance. Beginning September 1, 2007,
manufacturers have been required to place NCAP star ratings on
all automobile price sticker labels. 71
Thanks to the efforts of the NHTSA and litigation,
today’s consumers care about automotive safety, and
manufacturers are responding appropriately. Now that safety
sells, “no automaker wants to be seen as being behind the
curve.” 72 According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS), automakers “have really taken the lead in the safety
arena” since mid-2008. 73 Moreover, as consumers demand the
latest crashworthiness features and safety systems, carmakers are
already going “far beyond what the federal government has
required,” by developing and installing early warning systems
and other crash-avoidance features. 74

Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 18.
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 772 (4thD. 1981);
see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1013 (1990-1991); John R. Danley, Polishing Up the Pinto: Legal
Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 205 (2005).
70
Ronald G. Burns & Michael J. Lynch, A Space for Safety: The
Transformation of Automobile Safety Advertising in Response to NHTSA
Crash Test Implementation, 1977 to 1981, 40 SOC. SCI. J. 635 (2003).
71
NCAP APPROACHES, DOT HS 810 698, at 4.
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Gilbert, supra note 62, at 424.
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Despite these great advances, critics warn against giving
the manufacturers too much credit. The nature of the safety-sells
mentality means that the dedication to safety will only endure as
long as consumers’ dedication to spend money on safety endures.
Critics like Consumer Reports also warn that automakers
frequently abuse the high demand for safety features by making
them only available when packaged with unnecessary, highmargin options.75 For example, the Honda Civic, which is
consistently one of the top ten best-selling cars in the country, is
advertised as having a base price of approximately $16,000. 76
However, in order to get a Civic with electronic stability control,
which many critics believe is an essential safety mechanism that
should already be standard on all cars and which typically costs
an additional $1,500 on its own, the buyer must upgrade to the
EX-L model. 77 The EX-L has a base price of $22,000 and
includes such unnecessary features as alloy wheels, heated seats,
and a power sunroof. 78
Still, it appears as if manufacturers are accepting a larger
role in the design and implementation of safer vehicles, overall.
This is an important component of creating consistent auto
safety, however, the manufacturers generally only respond to the
demands of other market forces. Therefore, it is necessary that all
of the components that drive auto safety in the U.S. continue to
evolve and work in unison. So far, this note has discussed the
effects of regulation, litigation and manufacturer action based on
consumer demand, however, these enforcement mechanisms on
their own aren’t responsible for the full power behind the
development of safer vehicles.
E. Conclusions Regarding the Sources of Automotive Safety
Although the NHTSA is crucial in creating the long-term
policies that dictate many aspects of the automotive industry,
regulation has proven to be insufficient on its own because its
culture and limited resources all but prevent effective reactive
measures. Similarly, while litigation is an essential tool for
individual victims seeking redress, it fails to directly encourage
Cars Must Be Safer, supra note 36, at 6.
Build and Price Your Honda, HONDA.COM, (last visited Apr. 19, 2011)
http://automobiles.honda.com/tools/build-price/models.aspx (click on “2011
Civic Sedan Starting at $15,805”).
77
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consumer behavior and may not directly drive manufacturers’
conduct either. Finally, market forces may provide
manufacturers with the best incentive to develop safety features,
but the roots of this interest in safety are only as deep as
consumers’ pockets. Based on these considerations, it is clear that
there must be more than these three forces fueling the
development of automotive safety technology. A brief
examination of a few of the major automotive scandals of the last
50 years may help shed some light on the elusive fourth element.
As we first saw in the mid-1960s following the publication
of Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, the real force behind
automotive safety is deeply rooted in the public perception.
Ralph Nader was not the first person who tried to shame the
manufacturers, but he was the loudest. Once the public
consciousness had been engaged, Congress was quick to begin
developing the NHTSA, and courts broadened the duties
imposed on the automakers. A decade later, Mark Dowie
prompted a similar level of moral indignation from consumers
when his article “Pinto Madness” was featured in the magazine
Mother Jones. In the mid-1980s, the NHTSA launched an
investigation into the complaints it had been receiving about
sudden unintended acceleration in Audi sedans. Audi voluntarily
added a brake transmission interlock, and the number of
complaints quickly dropped off. 79 According to the lead author of
the NHTSA’s 1989 investigation, Robert Quinn Brackett, the
agency dropped the matter entirely before pinpointing the exact
cause of the acceleration or determining whether the brake
interlock system could make other cars safer. Bracket said: “The
noise level dropped. The issue had moved on in terms of
notoriety, which does drive research budgets.” 80
Toyota’s recent sudden unintended acceleration scandal is
another perfect example. In March 2007, the NHTSA and Toyota
first launched an investigation based on five complaints of
jammed gas pedals in the 2007 Lexus ES350s. 81 Following a fatal
accident that July, the NHTSA required Toyota to recall 55,000
floor mats and then closed the investigation. 82 In a confidential
Kindy & Whoriskey, supra note 37, at 2.
Id.
81
Bill Vlasic, Toyota’s Slow Awakening to a Deadly Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2010, at 11; Eric Owles & Daniel McDermon, A Toyota Timeline,
NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/02/10/
business/20100210_TOYOTA_TIMELINE2.html.
82
Id.
79
80
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presentation to Toyota executives, the company estimated that it
saved $100 million by negotiating with the regulators to limit the
breadth of the recall. The two Toyota employees responsible for
the company’s favorable outcome were former NHTSA
employees. 83 Similar incidents continued through 2008, including
another fatality in a 2005 Camry that had not been included in
the original recall, but nothing further was done. 84 Then, on
August 28, 2009, an off-duty highway patrol officer was traveling
with his family in a 2007 Lexus ES350 when the pedal got
stuck. 85 A frantic 911 call recorded the passengers’ terror in the
moments before they were killed. 86 By mid-September the
national media outlets latched onto the story, which was quickly
becoming a major problem for Toyota. Approximately two weeks
after the first national headline, Toyota announced on September
29, 2009 that it would recall 3.8 million vehicles due to faulty
floor mats. 87 From these examples emerges a much clearer picture
of the true force driving automotive safety: the media. 88
The pattern that has developed over the past 50 years is
quite disturbing. Consistently, every 10 years the media identifies
a major safety deficiency, outraged consumers change their
buying habits, the manufacturers scramble to change some aspect
of production, and politicians, salivating at the thought of stump
speech consumer protection regulations, demand special hearings
and draft new legislation. Unfortunately, the fervor with which
the automakers and legislators respond endures only as long as
the public pays attention. Once the media moves on, the
legislation falls by the wayside and automakers let down their
guard, allowing a new problem to take root.
Recognizing the role of the media reveals the true
Kaufmann, supra note 39.
Owles & McDermon, supra note 81.
85
Id.
86
Vlasic, supra note 81, at 11.
87
Nick Bunkley, Toyota Recalls 3.8 Million Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2009, at 12.
88
The media frenzy reached a fever pitch in December 2009 when four
people were killed when a Toyota Avalon inexplicably sped into a lake. The
police found the floor mats in the Avalon’s trunk. The original recall was
eventually broadened to include more than 11 million Toyota and Lexus
vehicles globally, and Toyota paid three fines totaling $48.8 million for not
properly reporting known problems to the NHTSA. Following a 10-month
investigation, the NHTSA announced on February 11, 2011 that the cause of
the sudden unintended acceleration must have been a mechanical problem
rather than an electronic one. Many critics remain unconvinced.
83
84
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relationship of the three disparate forces that have each
historically claimed primary responsibility for automotive safety.
The picture that emerges is that each one has a specific strength
that is indispensable to the overall development of automotive
safety. First, litigation verifies individual complaints and creates
incentives for attorneys and consultants to watch for early
warnings and patterns and then to seek justice for victims.
Second, the media uses the information collected by attorneys and
legitimized by the courts to bring major safety concerns to the
public’s attention. Finally, the sudden public awareness provides
manufacturers with incentive to fix the problem before it affects
the brand and consumer behavior.
As we move forward with the hope of making preventable
traffic fatalities a thing of the past, we need to use this new
understanding to encourage each of these elements to work
together and capitalize on the growing momentum behind new
safety technology. By focusing on the individual strengths of
these four elements, we may finally break the automotive defect
scandal cycle and learn to correct problems before they result in
serious injuries and fatalities.

II. THE FUTURE OF AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY
TECHNOLOGY
As a result of the 2010 Toyota sudden acceleration
scandal, politicians drafted legislation aimed at broadening the
powers of the NHTSA to prevent such a large-scale quality
control crisis from reoccurring. Due to significant pushback from
automakers and their lobbyists, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
2010 died quietly at the end of the that Congressional session.
The potential for a safer future on the road, however, has never
been greater.
With the annual number of traffic fatalities per vehicle
mile traveled sharply declining, it is clear that the automotive
safety is improving. While government programs designed to
educate drivers and improve roadways have certainly
contributed to this progress, it is the technology in the vehicles
themselves that have the greatest potential to impact driver
safety. 89
89
VANASSE HANGEN BRUSTLIN, INC., DEPT. OF TRANSP., TOWARD ZERO
DEATHS: A NATIONAL STRATEGY ON HIGHWAY SAFETY 10 (2011) [hereinafter
TOWARD ZERO DEATHS].
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Since the advent of the automobile, safety advocates
including automakers have focused almost exclusively on passive
safety features, but, historically, the primary cause of highway
injuries and fatalities is not defects but rather some kind of driver
error. Resigned to the belief that collisions were unavoidable
“accidents,” safety advocates developed features, such as seat
belts, crumple zones, anti-lock brakes and airbags, all of which
were primarily aimed at ameliorating injuries rather than
preventing them outright. Over the past several decades, major
improvements have been made to provide safety systems like
anti-lock brakes and electronic stability control, which when used
together have proven to reduce fatalities dramatically. 90 While
these passive safety features will always be invaluable, safety
advocates have begun to wonder whether there might be a better
approach to making cars safer.
Thanks to the recent advances in technology and
telecommunications that have already saturated nearly every
other aspect of our culture, a new way of thinking about
automotive safety has emerged. This new approach rejects the
old assumption that collisions were unavoidable. In this new era,
automakers have the tools they need to begin introducing active
safety features that finally address the real cause of most
collisions—driver error. Examples of the active safety features
that are currently on the market include lane departure warning
systems, which can act as an in-car rumble strip to alert the
driver when he or she is unintentionally leaving the roadway,
driver alertness monitoring, which monitors eye orientation and
activity, and side-object detection systems that alert drivers when
another vehicle is in their blind spot. A recent study predicts that
each of these features has the potential to reduce traffic fatalities
by five to ten percent. 91
Currently, the consensus seems to be that drivers are
better off having more safety features, as long as the dangers
avoided outweigh the in-car distractions created by a single safety
feature. This delicate balance hints at the massive problem posed
by distracted drivers. According to the NHTSA, “5,780 people
lost their lives and an estimated 515,000 people were injured in
police-reported vehicle accidents in 2008 in which at least one

90
Drew Winter, Electronics Taking Over Safety, WARD’S AUTO WORLD,
Sept. 2009, at 26.
91
TOWARD ZERO DEATHS, supra note 89, at 16.
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form of driver distraction was reported on the accident report.” 92
Because this is a detail that drivers are unlikely to divulge and
police officers have a hard time knowing without being told, the
true numbers are likely much higher. With these startling
statistics in mind, as we look to improving highway safety over
the next decade, eliminating driver distractions needs to be a
major focus not just for auto manufacturers but also for
regulators.
Each automaker decides how these active safety features
communicate the warnings to drivers, and therefore the delivery
methods vary dramatically. 93 Not surprisingly, Americans have
reacted very negatively to these bells and whistles, and as a
result, automakers try to balance useful alerts without making
the driver feel any less in control of his or her vehicle. 94 Methods
of warning drivers vary from simple sounds to flashing lights and
haptic feedback. For example, when a vehicle enters the blind
zone of a Buick LaCrosse sedan, an amber light is illuminated on
the driver’s side-view mirror. 95 Some vehicles alert the driver by
vibrating the steering wheel or tugging lightly on the seatbelt. 96
Other manufacturers have begun introducing features that go a
step further and actually intervene on behalf of the driver. For
example, when the Acura RL sedan recognizes that a crash is
imminent and the driver is unresponsive to audio, visual, and
tactile alerts, the car applies the brakes itself. 97 In the current
market, however, the sense among consumers is that there is a
fine line between good safety features and annoying ones. To
combat this, “most automakers are installing switches that allow
drivers to deactivate” the more pervasive and unnecessary
features. 98
These new active safety features are not only important
because they save lives, but also because many of them address

92

Dangers of Driver Distractions, 31 INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER 12, at 13

(2009).
Michael LeGault, As Radar Safety Features Spread, When Will Drivers
Say ‘Enough’?, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 1, 2010, at 13.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Jameson M. Wetmore, Redefining Risks and Redistributing
Responsibilities: Building Networks to Increase Automobile Safety, 29 SCI.,
TECH., & HUM. VALUES 377 (2004).
97
Jamie Page Deaton, Keep Your Mind on the Road: How Technology
Can Help Fight Distractions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2010, at 73.
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issues that are likely to grow dramatically over the coming
decades. Americans are not only living longer these days, they’re
also driving longer. According to census projections, by 2020
there will be approximately 40 million licensed drivers over the
age of 65 in the United States. 99 Unfortunately, older drivers are
at considerably greater risk of suffering from slower reaction
times, diminished vision, and chronic health issues requiring
medication that alters perception and alertness. 100 Recognizing
these risks, the American Medical Association, with support from
the NHTSA, created the Physician’s Guide to Assessing and
Counseling Older Drivers. Now in its second edition, this guide is
crucial not just in helping physicians advise patients’ families
about when it is time to stop driving, but also in educating older
drivers that there are simple steps they can take to reduce their
risk without having to give up their license altogether. 101
Active safety features are also important in counteracting
the growing list of distractions that face today’s drivers. Some
safety advocates caution that manufacturers are going overboard
with hands-free technology, warning that, paradoxically, many of
the tools offered under the auspices of mitigating distractions
actually just create bigger ones. For example, in late 2010 General
Motors announced that OnStar, the communications system
already installed on many of its vehicles, would soon allow
drivers to update their Facebook status using voice commands, as
if the technology cannot distract a driver who has his or her
hands free. 102 John Capp, director of global active safety at
General Motors, said: “As we put more of these features into
vehicles, there’s always a risk of information overload or causing
a distraction.” 103 Some skeptics warn of a more troubling risk,
“the offset hypothesis.” This hypothesis suggests that the
proliferation of innovations intended to improve safety will cause
drivers to be less vigilant themselves. 104 Fortunately, some
automakers are taking responsible steps to alleviate some of the
distractions. Ford, for example, equips a growing number of their
models with a “Do Not Disturb” button on the front console,
99
AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE TO ASSESSING AND COUNSELING
OLDER DRIVERS 3 (2d ed. 2010).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 4.
102
Deaton, supra note 97, at 73.
103
LeGault, supra note 93, at 14.
104
Study Examines Effect of Safety Features on Driver Behavior,
PROFESSIONAL SAFETY, 6 (2006).
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which blocks incoming calls and texts while the vehicle is
moving. 105
Thanks to the media’s coverage of auto safety scandals
and the public’s reactions, automakers are now taking a growing
interest in the development of auto safety technology. Until
recently, automakers invested significant sums of money in
developing outlandish “concept cars” that purported to reveal
where the brand saw itself a few decades in the future. The
vehicles rarely bore any resemblance to the rest of the brands’
cars nor were they intended to predict future styles. Instead, these
cars were merely publicity stunts, intended to make their
otherwise-bland minivans, for example, seem part of a “cool”
brand. When the recent downturn in the auto industry caused
automakers to curtail their spending, many automakers realized
that safety technology development offers a better bang for their
buck and seem to be redirecting some of their design resources
toward safety.
As much as automakers are trying to build their brands
around safety, they have not yet completely abandoned their long
tradition of dragging their feet with respect to such features. In
fact, it was the auto industry’s powerful lobbyists that killed the
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2010 by demanding countless
revisions. Fortunately, the NHTSA has recognized both the
potential these features have to mitigate fatalities and the
importance of demanding that manufacturers uniformly comply.
In an effort to promote new technology, for example, the NHTSA
recently announced that manufacturers will be required to equip
all cars with electronic stability control by 2012. In an effort to
encourage automakers to adopt other features as well, under the
new NCAP testing procedures unveiled in October 2010, only
cars with collision warning and lane-departure alert systems were
eligible for the coveted five-star safety rating in 2011. 106
It is through this long-term policy development that the
NHTSA is most influential in developing safer automobiles. The
NHTSA has never been as important as it is right now because
the next automotive safety feature on the horizon will never work
if it has nothing more than market forces to rely on. For example,
car-to-car communications systems may eventually allow vehicles
to broadcast their speed, location, and other key data to other
vehicles nearby in order to help prevent crashes and generally
105
106

LeGault, supra note 93, at 14.
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improve the flow of traffic. Despite the obvious obstacles
presented from a privacy perspective, auto manufacturers are
already starting to develop and debate implementation. The
problem, according to Volkswagen development chief Dr. Ulrich
Hackenberg, is that there needs to be “a critical mass of 10% of
all the vehicles on the road to be equipped before there are any
benefits for customers.” 107 Even if regulators mandate equipping
every new vehicle with car-to-car communications technology, it
would take at least five years before market saturation reached
10%. 108 In the meantime, manufacturers and consumers would be
paying for technology that had little or no effect on their safety.
Although already working on developing the technology,
automakers disagree about whether regulators should require
that all new cars have the technology. 109 While some automakers
opine that such regulation would help bring down costs and
speed up the implementation process, other manufacturers warn,
albeit less convincingly, that it may be detrimental to their overall
safety development programs because it eliminates an incentive
to compete. 110 The unspoken concern among automakers is that
such systems will likely create a vast new source of tort liability.

III. CONCLUSION: THE FULL-SIZE FUTURE OF THE
SUBCOMPACT AUTOMOBILE
The NHTSA’s real power, though rooted in its long-term
policy-making, is not limited to making safety requirements. The
NHTSA also wields enormous influence over the auto industry
by setting the fuel efficiency standards. Until the 1973 OPEC
crisis, gas prices had been consistently low enough that fuel
economy was not a major concern for consumers considering
buying a new car. Instead, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the
American automobile companies were engaged in a full-scale
horsepower war, with each new vehicle consuming more gas in
order to produce more power. Meanwhile, in Europe, higher gas
prices, narrower roads, and more crowded cities provided
consumers with a natural incentive to favor smaller cars. The gas
shortage in the early 1970s, however, provided the U.S. with a
Tristan Honeywill, The Long Hard Road to Safety, 34 AUTOMOTIVE
ENGINEER 4, at 34 (2009).
108
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110
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rude awakening regarding its dependence on gasoline. In an
effort to lessen the country’s vulnerability should another gas
shortage hit, the NHTSA created the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) regulations in 1975 to guide manufacturers’
development of more fuel-efficient vehicles.
Between 1978 and 1985, the fuel economy standards rose
from 18 miles per gallon (mpg) to 27.5 mpg. 111 With hybrid
technology and lighter weight materials still decades away from
being feasible, the only way to achieve better fuel economy was
by selling more small and underpowered vehicles. In response to
the new fuel standards, the Big Three American automakers,
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, began developing
subcompact cars, including the Ford Pinto. When gas prices
returned to their normal levels, however, these automakers
struggled to convince consumers to purchase these subcompact
vehicles. As evidenced by the infamous Ford Pinto, the
automakers stripped the subcompacts of all their luxuries so as to
lower the price enough to generate sufficient demand.
However, profit margins were still much larger on full-size
vehicles, so over the next three decades, automakers developed
lighter materials and more efficient engines, and applied them to
their bigger vehicles. In other words, despite the great progress
being made in fuel efficiency overall, average fuel economy
stayed right at 27.5 mpg while cars resumed their pre-1973 rate of
growth. The NHTSA allowed this trend by keeping the fuel
economy standards at about 27.5 mpg from 1985 until 2005. 112
During this time, the average weight of an automobile increased
by approximately 1,000 pounds and the average dimensions
increased by approximately four inches in each direction. 113 In
addition, less stringent light truck fuel economy standards have
caused manufacturers to market high profit margin vehicles such
as the minivan and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) to populations
that would otherwise have only bought a full-size car. Sadly, by
not increasing their fuel economy standards to match the
manufacturers’ technological progress, the NHTSA missed an
111
DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
AUTOMOTIVE FUEL ECONOMY PROGRAM ANNUAL UPDATE CALENDAR YEAR
2003 5 (2004).
112
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113
Karl Brauer, Time Is Right for Small Cars – As Long as Somebody Else
Is Driving Them, EDMUNDS AUTO OBSERVER, http://www.autoobserver.com
/2010/09/time-is-right-for-small-cars-as-long-as-somebody-else-is-drivingthem.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
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important opportunity to encourage the development of small
cars and their safety components. However, the NHTSA has
taken important steps to change this. In April 2011, the NHTSA
announced that average fuel economy for each manufacturer
must reach 35.5 mpg by 2016. 114 In addition, the light truck
segment, which accounted for approximately half of all
automotive sales in the U.S. during the first eleven months of
2010, will need to achieve 30 mpg. 115
With gas prices currently on the rise, it seems likely that in
approximately 15 years, Americans will embrace the subcompact
automobile to the same degree that such cars have been popular
in Western Europe for decades. 116 In order for this to happen,
there are essentially three cultural shifts that need to take place to
make subcompacts nearly replace all full-size cars and trucks that
are nonessential to consumers’ work. First, rising gas prices will
make bigger cars less desirable. Second, people will begin to see
small cars as safer. New safety features are already making
headway in this respect. More importantly, car-to-car
communication systems that safety experts predict will begin to
saturate the market in six to eight years may greatly diminish the
possibility of an accident caused by another vehicle. Similarly,
considering that these larger vehicles pose the greatest safety
threat to small cars, subcompacts will also benefit from there
being fewer SUVs and trucks on the road, which will help this
shift develop momentum. Third, people will begin thinking about
subcompacts as more than just bare-bones economy cars. In order
for this third shift to take place, automakers will need to
recognize that the optional equipment such as leather seats and
navigation systems that buyers associate with “luxury vehicles”
provide higher profit margins for subcompact cars and make
Deepa Seetharaman, Meeting Fuel Standards Without Losing Brawn,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2011, at 2.
115
Id.
116
Microcars such as the Smart car, on the other hand, are unlikely to
become more popular in the United States in the foreseeable future. Like the
subcompacts, they are popular in Europe because they take up very little room
and achieve excellent fuel economy. Their only real distinction from
subcompacts is that they are generally shorter in length, taller in height, and
usually offer seating for no more than two people and virtually no cargo area.
Considering the U.S. does not face overcrowding issues to the same degree
Europe does, even as the subcompact’s popularity rises and ameliorates some
of the safety concerns surrounding the microcar’s inherently light and tight
construction, the car’s slightly smaller footprint will not sufficiently offset its
striking lack of utility.
114
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them more desirable to consumers as well.
The good news is that all three of these trends have begun
to occur. When gas prices peaked a few years ago, many
automakers realized their supply of small cars was inadequate.
Many automakers temporarily boosted production levels, and
also began developing new subcompact vehicles that are only
now coming to market as gas prices are again increasing. Second,
in addition to the safety features that are expected in the next
decade, other major steps have been made to rid the roads of the
threat-posing larger vehicles. The Car Allowance Rebate System
that ran in July and August 2009, also known as the Cash-forClunkers program, had a major impact on the number of larger
vehicles on the road. Nearly 700,000 “clunkers” with an average
fuel economy of 15.8 miles per gallon were traded in during this
program, and consumers opted for new cars that were generally
smaller and 58% more fuel efficient than the vehicles they traded
in. 117 Furthermore, the NHTSA recently raised its fuel economy
standards, providing manufacturers with a very compelling
reason to sell more subcompacts in order to meet those tough fuel
economy standards.
While full-size sedans and trucks are currently seen as the
safest vehicles on the road, their safety status comes from the
comparative advantages they have over small cars. Considering
that fuel prices and CAFE fuel economy standards are likely to
necessitate smaller and lighter cars in the coming decade, the
move to a more ubiquitous use of subcompact vehicles would be
a strong step in the right direction for automotive safety in the
United States. As this note discussed, however, there are many
components that must continue to work in unison for the
optimum safety level to be reached. Regulations must continue to
be monitored, especially as new technologies and safety standards
are developed. In the event that manufacturers aren’t responding
fast enough to regulatory mandates or public demand, litigation
can speed the process of reform. For each of these factors to work,
the media must maintain a vigilant eye on the design updates
made to vehicles so that informed consumers can make the
necessary demands if not decisions to litigate. These factors must
be taken together to drive automotive design in the U.S. to even
greater levels of safety.
Press Release, Department of Transportation, Cash For Clunkers
Wraps Up with Nearly 700,000 Car Sales and Increased Fuel Efficiency (Aug.
26, 2009) available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2009/dot13309.htm.
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